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Briefing Paper 1 
SCOTTISH RAILWAY POLICY - PAST, PRESENT - AMD FUTURE? 
Irvine Lapsley 
University of Edinburgh 
The major thrust of this briefing paper i s 
to evaluate current and past railway 
policy and to outline proposals which can 
overcome previous policy failures. Much 
of the discussion on railway policy has 
involved l i t t l e more than posturing by the 
main p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s . D e s p i t e 
p r o t e s t a t i o n s to the contrary, the i r 
actual pol ic ies when in power have been 
remarkably s imi la r . I t i s argued here 
that much of the contentious nature of the 
debate over railway policy can be resolved 
by a reappraisal of some fundamental 
economic a t t r i b u t e s of railway services. 
On the b a s i s of t h i s r e a p p r a i s a l , 
suggestions are made for the possible 
restructuring of railway services and the 
i m p l i c a t i o n s of such proposa ls for 
Scottish railway services are explored. 
These d i f f e r i n g views cen t r e on the 
acceptability or otherwise of 'profit' as an 
objective for a financially unremunerative 
s t a t e i n d u s t r y , such as the r a i l w a y s . 
Contrasting views on the appropriateness of 
the profit objective are often presented as 
following a clear political divide, with the 
Right cr i t ical of monolithic, unprofitable 
state industry and the Left as proponents of 
the ra i lway as a ' s o c i a l c o r p o r a t i o n ' . 
Indeed, such thinking permeates discussion 
of railway policy by policy-makers and other 
commentators. However, the pol icy 
i n i t i a t i v e s of successive governments of 
varying p o l i t i c a l complexions have always 
responded to the (perceived) need for the 
railways to be profitable (at however modest 
a level). Consequently in terms of actual 
policy, these different views appear to have 
had l i t t l e impact. 
Railway Policy - The Hidden Consensus 
Railways are notoriously unprofitable. 
For Br i t i sh Rail t h i s i s a matter of 
h i s to r i ca l record. The Scott ish region 
of BR i s no exception; in 1983, passenger 
income of £91.6m, freight revenues of £33rn 
and operating expenditures of £191m, left 
a de f i c i t of £66.1 m. This f inancial 
fa i lu re of railways i s cause for intense 
criticism from some quarters: i t i s taken 
as a symptom of inefficiency, stagnation, 
even of managerial inept i tude. On the 
other hand, defenders of railway systems 
have long pointed to social benefi ts 
which, they allege, are not encompassed in 
narrow f i n a n c i a l d e f i c i t s . These 
competing claims are fiercely contested. 
Indeed, the fu rore c rea ted over any 
radical policy i n i t i a t i v e on railways 
makes t h i s one of the most contentious 
aspects of public policy. 
Attachment to the 'profit' objective can be 
traced back to the creation of the railways 
as a s t a t e industry, in which the famil iar 
statutory financial obligation of 'breaking 
even, taking one year with the next ' , has 
been widely m i s i n t e r p r e t e d . This 
requirement referred to a measure of surplus 
or de f ic i t quite different from prof i t or 
loss as measured by the best commercial 
practice of that time. Thus, in computing 
surplus or deficit, deductions from revenues 
received had to be made for t ransfers to 
reserves and for the redemption of debt. 
Th i s i m p l i e s t he e a r n i n g of some 
( u n s p e c i f i e d ) l e v e l of p r o f i t , as 
conven t iona l ly computed (see Lapsley, 
1981a). 
Fur thermore, s ince the ea r ly days of 
nationalisation there have been successive 
pronouncements (regardless of the political 
complexion of the administration) which have 
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pointed to the pre-eminent, wider, 'social 
role' of the railways. These include the 
White Papers of 1956 and 1966, the 
Transport Act of 1968 and Minister ial 
s t a t e m e n t s t o t h e House on t h e 
introduction of the Railways Act of 1974. 
However, these policy statements have been 
followed by changes in policy which not 
only responded to alarm over f inancial 
d e f i c i t s , but which a l so sought to 
reasser t f inancial objectives which did 
not take account of these 'wider, social 
benefi ts ' (for a fu l ler discussion, see 
Lapsley, 1983). The recurring financial 
c r i s e s a t B r i t i s h Rai l and the 
responsiveness of successive governments 
to financial c r i t e r i a as ' t r iggers ' for 
key policy changes represents a 'hidden 
consensus 1 amongst po l i cy -make r s . 
Indeed, the most recent policy ini t ia t ive, 
the Serpell Report, which explored the 
potential for a profi table railway (only 
to be roundly criticised for daring to do 
so), was an almost inevitable by-product 
of a financial policy implemented by a 
previous Labour administration. Thus, 
the Serpell inquiry was established as a 
consequence of the likelihood that BR's 
Public Services Obligation subsidy would 
exceed the l imi t on i t s size imposed by 
the Railways Act of 1974. 
Commercial v. Social Objectives - A 
Resolution of the Debate? 
In i t s p resen t form, BR cannot be 
p r o f i t a b l e - i t must be subs id i sed . 
Indeed, a need for subsidy was envisaged 
even in the most extreme of the options 
considered in the Serpell Report, in which 
the r a i l network was to be reduced to 
1,630 route miles (as opposed to i t s 
present 10,700 route miles) to provide a 
'commercial ' r a i lway . However the 
d i f f e r i n g viewpoints over whether BR 
should be a 'commercial' or a ' soc ia l ' 
railway are essentially misguided. Thus, 
i t i s possible that the debate over the 
appropr ia teness of 'commercial ' or 
' soc ia l ' objectives can be resolved by a 
reappraisal of the fundamental nature of 
railway services. Specifically, BR has 
always been treated by policy-makers as a 
vertically-integrated system - this fai ls 
to take account of the fact that there are 
two, qu i t e d i f f e r e n t , p a r t s of the 
railway: (i) the carriage of freight and 
passengers (the 'operating services') and 
( i i ) t h e permanent way of t r a c k , 
s ignall ing and support f a c i l i t i e s (the 
' r a i l w a y i n f r a s t r u c t u r e ' ) . The 
segregation of these two distinct aspects of 
the railways would result in a 'commercial 
railway' (ie the operating services) and a 
'social railway' (ie the infras t ructure) . 
The ra t ionale for such a segregation i s 
based on (a) t he d e s i r a b i l i t y of 
liberalising transport services and (b) the 
uneven incidence of social benefi ts . As 
regards the f i r s t of these, there are marked 
differences between the principal assets of 
t h e o p e r a t i n g s e r v i c e s and t h e 
infras t ructure for a l l modes of transport 
(road, ra i l , air and sea) which are cri t ical 
influences in the development of market 
s t ructures . Thus, on the one hand, the 
principal assets of the operating services 
l a r g e l y e x h i b i t t h e f o l l o w i n g 
characteristics: low capital cost (whether 
a c q u i s i t i o n cos t or oppor tuni ty cos t ) 
r e l a t ive to infras t ructure asse ts ; short 
useful lives; l i t t l e indivisibility. As a 
consequence of these a t t r i bu t e s of the i r 
principal assets, the operating services of 
road, air and sea generally face competitive 
markets for their services because of weak 
barriers to entry, which permit rival firms 
ready access to such markets. The major 
except ion to t h i s i s r a i l , p re sen t ly 
organised as a statutory monopoly, although 
government regulation has often reduced 
competitive pressures in the other modes, 
too. 
On the other hand, the principal assets of 
transport infrastructure of road and r a i l 
(and, to a lesser extent, for sea and a i r ) 
have attributes which contrast with those of 
the opera t ing s e r v i c e s . Thus, t h e i r 
capital costs are exceptionally high; their 
asse ts are highly specif ic , with l i t t l e or 
no alternative uses; often these assets have 
high economies of scale and are highly 
ind iv is ib le . All of these a t t r i b u t e s 
create high barriers to entry, which inhibit 
competitive pressures and promote monopoly, 
often accompanied by state ownership. (For 
fu r t he r d e t a i l s , see Lapsley, 1984). 
Therefore , by segrega t ing the ra i lway 
service from the railway infrastructure, a 
liberalisation of operating services by al l 
modes would be promoted and infrastructure 
asse ts of a l l modes might be treated on a 
consistent basis . 
Furthermore, t h i s proposed segregation i s 
supported by a closer examination of the 
issue of whether or not there are social 
benefits associated with railway services. 
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In the f i r s t ins tance, there i s evidence 
that the social costs (of serious injury 
and l o s s of l i f e ; of no i se ; and of 
e f f ic ien t use of energy) of railways are 
s l igh t (see Lapsley, 1981b). Also, the 
social benefits of the railways appear to 
be largely associated with the railway 
inf ras t ruc ture , r a t h e r than wi th the 
operating services . Thus, in the cost-
benefit analyses of numerous branch lines, 
at the time of the 1968 Transport Act, the 
weight of evidence suggested tha t there 
were no social benefits of such railway 
operations. 
On the other hand, i t i s evident tha t 
there i s a failure of the price mechanism 
in t h e p r o v i s i o n of t r a n s p o r t 
infrastructure. Thus, there i s no system 
of road pricing, in which motoris ts pay 
for the use of roads. The current system 
of taxing road users represents a poor 
proxy for money prices. With the present 
system of taxes, the motorist perceives a 
zero price to be paid for the use of roads 
and severe congestion of roads can a r i se 
as a r e su l t . The existence of a r a i l 
network provides an alternative system of 
transport which eases this congestion - a 
social benefit which does not appear in 
BR's financial results. Also, as regards 
investment policy, the strategic nature of 
investment in transport infrastructure (ie 
the maintenance of society 's choice of 
t ransport modes for present and future 
generations) i s not reflected in financial 
results . 
Restructuring Railway Services: Some 
Proposals 
To the casual observer, the proposed 
segregation of railway operating services 
and railway inf ras t ruc ture might appear 
somewhat odd. However, there i s already 
cons iderab le use of BR's t r a c k by 
privately-owned f r e i g h t wagons (some 
16,000 such vehicles in 1983, almost two-
th i rds of which were tank wagons). In 
the recent past , Pullman t r a i n s were 
privately-owned railway operators. Also, 
in the d is tant past , railway companies 
owned the i n f r a s t r u c t u r e and o ther 
organisations were carriers. Sometimes 
these ca r r i e r s were the sole operators, 
sometimes they competed with each other 
and railway companies. Such competition 
tended to be eliminated by the restr ict ive 
pract ices of railway companies, a trend 
which was further reinforced by government 
r e g u l a t i o n and s t a t e ownership. The 
following proposals outlined here would 
reverse this trend. 
As far as the S c o t t i s h r a i lways a re 
concerned, the nature of the i r services i s 
consistent with the infrastructure-operating 
services dichotomy outlined above. Thus, 
i t i s evident that Scottish railway services 
opera te in a compe t i t ive environment, 
despite being part of a s ta tutory railway 
monopoly. This can be seen from the 
competition which the railways face on the 
two main Anglo-Scottish Inter-City routes 
from Edinburgh and Glasgow, which face 
strong rivalry from air and road travel for 
business and casual t ravel lers . Improved 
air links and the availability of motorways 
have also provided competition for sleeper 
and motorail services to the South. Also, 
the suburban l ines in the Greater Glasgow 
and Edinburgh areas have parallel bus routes 
and comprehensive road networks which 
promote competition from bus services and 
private motorists for commuter and casual 
t raff ic . 
Given t h a t t h i s i s so , how might the 
proposed res t ruc tur ing of the railways be 
implemented and what benefits are likely as 
a resu l t? I t has already been suggested 
t h a t two c o m p a n i e s - a r a i l w a y 
infras t ructure and a ra i lway ope ra t ing 
company - might be formed. From the same 
basic analysis, i t i s possible to envisage a 
number of var ian ts . For example, on the 
infrastructure side, i t would be possible to 
d iv ide r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for the ra i lway 
i n f r a s t r u c t u r e on a reg iona l b a s i s , 
par t icu lar ly where t h i s would promote a 
systems approach t o i n f r a s t r u c t u r e 
development and extension. Thus, central 
government in Scotland might oversea major 
road and railway infrastructure development 
in an integrated fashion. 
The potential for variation is even greater 
with the operating services. Thus, given 
the nature of these services - the absence 
of s o c i a l c o s t s and b e n e f i t s and the 
competitive nature of the i r operations -
there i s a potential for the introduction of 
pr ivate capi ta l as an a l t e rna t ive to a 
publicly-owned railway company. There need 
not be a single operating company, public or 
private and, indeed, i t i s likely that more 
than one railway operating company would 
emerge. Thus, for example, a nationwide 
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Inter-City company, linking a l l the major 
c i t i e s of the UK and inc luding the 
Glasgow-Edinburgh-Dundee-Aberdeen routes, 
might be formed. In addition, smaller 
companies based on areas of dense 
population might serve local commuter 
needs. This would most evidently apply 
around Edinburgh and Glasgow, but might 
a lso include Aberdeen and Inverness. 
There would s t i l l be a need to serve rural 
t r a v e l l e r s , in Highland, Grampian, 
Dumfries and Galloway and the Borders, 
where the same mass movement does not 
occur. Faced with a low density of 
traffic, i t i s unlikely that such services 
would prove to be profi table. However, 
i t would be possible for such services to 
be provided by operators in receipt of 
some subsidy. 
These proposals must be judged against the 
s ta tus quo and what i s l ikely to occur if 
the present ra i lway policy pe r s i s t s . 
Current policy does not augur well for 
S c o t t i s h r a i l w a y s e r v i c e s . Two 
alternatives for Scottish railways present 
themselves, on the basis of past and 
existing policies towards BR. On the one 
hand, the re might be a d r a s t i c (or , 
possibly, a piecemeal) reduction in the 
size of the railways. This has happened 
over the past 20 years and the exis t ing 
route network cannot be taken for granted. 
The most extreme of the options in the 
Serpell Report (in which Scottish railway 
s e r v i c e s were l i m i t e d to C a r l i s l e -
Car s ta i rs-Edinburgh-Glasgow) appear 
unlikely to be implemented. However, on 
the basis of past behaviour, decisions on 
the future of the ra i l network will be on 
financial grounds. Dependent on the 
depth of the financial crisis confronting 
t h e government of t he day, t he 
Glasgow/Oban/Fort William/Mallaig; the 
I n v e r n e s s / K y l e of Locha l sh , t h e 
I n v e r n e s s / T h u r s o / W i c k and t h e 
Aberdeen/Elgin/Inverness lines would be in 
greatest jeopardy from closure. 
On' the other hand, BR might just doggedly 
s t i c k to e v e r - t i g h t e n i n g f i n a n c i a l 
constraints and survive. In t h i s case, 
on the face of i t , there might be no 
substantive differences from the railways 
of today. However, the major difference 
i s l ikely to be in the quality of service 
with older, slower locomotives losing out 
in the competition for passengers with an 
ever-more comprehensive road system which 
i s seen as a f r ee good by i t s u s e r s . 
Indeed, th i s i s most l ikely to occur in 
those lightly-used rural services mentioned 
above, where there i s much single track 
which makes ra i lway s e r v i c e s doubly 
vulnerable to the lack of punctuality (and 
concomitant loss of customer confidence) 
caused by delays and breakdowns of older 
locomotives. 
As an alternative to this slow decline, the 
proposed segregation of operating services 
and infrastructure would bring the following 
benefits: 
(1) An improvement in the planning and co-
ordination of major expenditures on 
road/rail infrastructure. 
(2) A c lose r r e l a t i o n s h i p between the 
operating companies and consumers, with 
the likelihood of increased operating 
e f f i c iency and improved quality of 
service. In addition, in those rural 
areas where competition i s leas t in 
evidence, greater co-operation over the 
co -o rd ina t ion of transport services 
between a l l modes would be promoted. 
(3) In an industry facing a severe shortage 
of cap i ta l , a par t icular benefit would 
be the possible injection of additional, 
private funds into the provision of 
modern r o l l i n g stock by p r i v a t e 
railway operating companies. 
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